The story of the quiet gambling operator who helped establish organized crime's casino interests in Las Vegas, survived Bugsy Siegel, and became one of the most influential figures in Nevada's early gaming industry.
The Man Behind the Mob's Las Vegas Casinos
When people discuss the Mob's early involvement in Las Vegas, the same names usually dominate the conversation: Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel, Meyer Lansky, Lucky Luciano, and later, men like Moe Dalitz and Frank "Lefty" Rosenthal. Morris "Moe" Sedway rarely receives equal billing, although he was one of the men who helped make the Mob's Las Vegas investments profitable.
While Siegel was threatening bookmakers, entertaining Hollywood celebrities, and spending enormous sums on the Flamingo Hotel, Sedway was developing relationships with casino operators, arranging gambling concessions, handling money, and quietly establishing the syndicate's presence in Nevada. He was involved with the Las Vegas Club, El Cortez, Golden Nugget, and Flamingo, and helped establish a lucrative race-wire operation that connected Nevada's legal gambling industry to organized crime's national network.
Sedway was no innocent businessman who accidentally found himself surrounded by criminals. His underworld associations stretched back to New York's street gangs, and he understood perfectly well how organized crime operated. But he also understood something that Siegel frequently forgot: a successful gambling business required more than intimidation. It needed reliable information, cooperative partners, sufficient capital, and someone who knew where the money was going.
For much of the 1940s, that someone was Moe Sedway.
From New York's Underworld to the National Syndicate
Sedway was born Morris Sidwirtz in 1894, in what was then part of the Russian Empire. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas identifies his birthplace as Poland. His family immigrated to the United States, and he grew up in New York City's Lower East Side, where poverty, overcrowding, and street gangs were familiar parts of neighborhood life.
As a young man, Sedway became associated with Benjamin Siegel and the criminal circles surrounding Meyer Lansky. His police record extended back to the early 1920s, when New York's neighborhood gangs were developing into increasingly sophisticated criminal organizations. Prohibition accelerated that transformation, generating fortunes for men willing to smuggle liquor, bribe officials, and eliminate competitors.
Siegel and Lansky became prominent members of this new criminal generation. Siegel, handsome, volatile, and ambitious, preferred a direct approach to business negotiations. Lansky was more interested in the financial possibilities of organized crime and the advantages of cooperating with other criminal organizations. Sedway occupied a position somewhere between the two. He could operate in their violent world, but his greatest usefulness came from handling the practical details of gambling enterprises.
The men in these circles maintained relationships with Charles "Lucky" Luciano, Frank Costello, and other figures who helped transform loosely organized criminal gangs into networks of cooperating organizations. Siegel's association with professional killers, including men connected to Murder, Inc., strengthened his reputation for violence. Sedway did not need the same notoriety. His association with powerful men was usually sufficient.
By the 1930s, organized crime had expanded beyond bootlegging into bookmaking, illegal casinos, loan-sharking, labor racketeering, and gambling information services. The legalization of casino gambling in Nevada offered something particularly attractive: a place where large amounts of gambling money could be handled openly, without the constant danger of a raid simply because gambling was taking place.
The syndicate did not have to create an illegal casino. It could acquire an interest in an existing legal establishment, provide financing, or arrange a business concession that generated steady income. Sedway was well suited to help make those arrangements.
Las Vegas Beckons
Nevada legalized wide-open casino gambling in 1931, but Las Vegas did not immediately become the entertainment capital of America. For years, its casinos were relatively modest establishments serving local residents, railroad workers, construction crews, and visitors passing through Southern Nevada. Downtown Fremont Street was the center of the gambling business, where establishments such as the Las Vegas Club, Boulder Club, and Northern Club offered blackjack, craps, roulette, slot machines, and race books.
Many operators knew how to run gambling games but lacked the capital to expand. That created an opportunity for outside investors. Men associated with Lansky could supply money, gambling expertise, and access to profitable services. In exchange, they expected a percentage of the business, sometimes through arrangements that did not fully appear on the official ownership records.
In Vegas and the Mob, I describe how Siegel and Sedway approached casino owners with offers of financing and improvements. A casino might need another crap game, additional blackjack tables, better equipment, or a larger bankroll to handle wealthy customers. Why not accept the money? The difficulty came when the investors expected a substantial share of the profits and a voice in management.
Siegel's reputation made negotiations particularly uncomfortable. Sedway, by contrast, could present himself as the practical businessman arranging the details. He developed relationships with downtown operators and helped establish the syndicate's interests in the Las Vegas Club and other properties.
One of his important connections was J. K. Houssels, an established Nevada gambling operator associated with the Las Vegas Club and El Cortez. The precise ownership percentages changed over time, and formal licensing records did not always reveal the full extent of outside financial interests. Nevertheless, Sedway's importance was unmistakable. He helped connect local casino operators with the national gambling interests that wanted a share of Nevada's growing industry.
The Race Wire: A Gambling Gold Mine
To understand Sedway's influence, it is necessary to understand the race wire. Today, racing information arrives instantly on a telephone or computer. In the 1940s, bookmakers depended on specialized services to obtain horse-racing results, scratches, jockey changes, and other information from tracks across the country. Without that information, a race book could not operate efficiently.
Continental Press, controlled by James Ragen, dominated the racing information business. Bookmakers throughout the country needed its service, making the company a valuable enterprise. The Mob recognized that controlling the information could be as profitable as operating the gambling establishments themselves. A service collecting weekly fees from hundreds of bookmakers could generate substantial income without owning a single casino.
Siegel became involved in a competing service generally known as Trans-America or Trans-American. His efforts to expand its business were accompanied by threats and violence in Southern California, where Mickey Cohen and other associates pressured bookmakers to change services. Cohen, a former boxer, was particularly useful when a bookmaker needed convincing. The message was not subtle.
Sedway handled Las Vegas differently. Rather than sending Cohen around Fremont Street with a collection of armed men, he relied on his relationships with casino operators. He arranged service for the Las Vegas Club, El Cortez, Golden Nugget, Boulder Club, and other establishments. Even relatively small operations became part of the system, although some lacked the volume to justify the fees.
In my research for Vegas and the Mob, I found that Sedway's Las Vegas arrangements were an important part of Siegel's western gambling interests. Siegel was willing to start a war over a bookmaker's refusal to cooperate, while Sedway preferred to complete the transaction and collect the money. That didn't make the business legitimate, but it made Sedway an effective representative.
The race wire was more than a source of racing results. It gave those controlling the service considerable influence over the bookmakers and casino operators who depended upon it. By the middle of the decade, Sedway had helped establish a profitable distribution network that would eventually become the subject of intense federal scrutiny.
The El Cortez and Davie Berman
The El Cortez opened in downtown Las Vegas in 1941 and soon became an important property in the developing casino industry. By the middle of the decade, its ownership involved a remarkable collection of gambling operators and underworld figures, including Siegel, Lansky, Sedway, Gus Greenbaum, Davie Berman, Charles "Chickie" Berman, and Israel "Icepick Willie" Alderman.
Davie Berman brought considerable gambling experience from Minneapolis, where he had operated in a difficult and sometimes violent underworld environment. Nevada's legal casino industry offered him the opportunity to run gambling establishments without the constant threat of prosecution simply for operating games. His arrival also illustrated how interconnected the national gambling organizations had become.
In Vegas and the Mob, I recount Berman's efforts to finance his purchase and the extraordinary story of his brother Chickie losing a large sum of investment money in a crap game before the transaction was completed. According to that account, Davie had to assemble additional funds to protect his brother and satisfy the investors. The episode illustrated one of the gambling industry's enduring contradictions: men who made fortunes taking money from gamblers were not always immune to gambling themselves.
The El Cortez group combined local operating experience with outside capital and underworld connections. Greenbaum brought experience from Arizona bookmaking, Berman understood casino operations, and Alderman supplied a considerably more intimidating presence. Sedway helped coordinate the relationships, while Siegel remained a powerful figure despite spending increasing amounts of time in California.
The El Cortez was a profitable operation, and its owners understood that the real money came from keeping the games running. They also understood the importance of the count room, where the cash from the gambling tables was collected and counted. A casino could have legitimate licensed owners while other investors maintained financial interests that were less visible to regulators.
Sedway understood these arrangements and the people involved. He knew the operators, maintained connections with Lansky and Siegel, and could help resolve the problems that arose when multiple investors expected a share of the profits. The El Cortez also became a steppingstone toward a much larger investment, one that would eventually make Siegel a Las Vegas legend and cost him his life.
That investment was the Flamingo.
Billy Wilkerson's Dream
The Flamingo is often described as Bugsy Siegel's creation, but the familiar story leaves out an essential figure: William R. "Billy" Wilkerson. Wilkerson was the publisher of The Hollywood Reporter and a successful Los Angeles nightclub operator whose establishments attracted entertainers, wealthy customers, and Hollywood personalities. He was also an enthusiastic gambler, which proved to be a troublesome combination.
Wilkerson envisioned a luxurious Las Vegas resort unlike the Western-themed hotel-casinos along Highway 91. He wanted elegant restaurants, fashionable entertainment, comfortable rooms, and a casino designed to attract affluent visitors. In 1945, he purchased land for the project and began developing what would become the Flamingo.
His plans were ambitious, and so were the costs. Construction required enormous amounts of money, particularly in the difficult postwar building environment. Materials were scarce, contractors demanded payment, and Wilkerson's gambling losses complicated his finances.
In Vegas and the Mob, I describe Wilkerson's negotiations with Sedway and Greenbaum as he sought additional money and assistance. Eventually, financing connected to Lansky's associates brought Siegel into the project. The arrangement did not remain a comfortable partnership. Siegel became increasingly involved in construction decisions, management, financing, and the resort's appearance.
He wanted the best of everything, and he wanted it immediately.
The plans changed repeatedly, costs climbed, and contractors encountered delays. Wilkerson gradually lost control of the enterprise he had conceived, while the investors became increasingly concerned about their money. Sedway watched these developments from his position within the Las Vegas gambling organization. He understood the potential of the resort, but he also knew that its investors expected a return. The Flamingo was supposed to be a profitable casino, not an endless construction project.
Sedway, Siegel, and the Price of Ambition
Siegel's behavior during the Flamingo's construction has become part of Las Vegas folklore. He argued with contractors, fought with his girlfriend Virginia Hill, and demanded expensive changes to the building. In my book, I recount an incident in which Siegel struck his head on a low beam in his unfinished penthouse and demanded costly alterations. The story captures his temperament, although not every detail of the exchange can be independently documented.
Siegel was accustomed to giving orders, but construction projects have a way of ignoring threats. Concrete must cure, materials must arrive, and workers must be paid. Eventually, money runs out.
Sedway's relationship with Siegel was complicated by another difference between the men. Sedway had developed a genuine interest in the Las Vegas community and local politics, while Siegel preferred to influence politicians from outside government. According to the account in Vegas and the Mob, Sedway told Siegel that he intended to enter politics.
Siegel reacted furiously.
"We don't run for office; we run the politicians!"
The remark, attributed to Siegel in the historical account, perfectly expresses the traditional Mob attitude toward public officials. Siegel reportedly grabbed Sedway by his jacket, marched him out of the Flamingo offices, and barred him from the property.
The ban didn't last. Sedway was too useful to discard over an argument, and he was soon back at work. The incident nevertheless revealed something about his ambitions. He was no longer content merely to be an underworld associate collecting money from gambling operations. He wanted a recognized position in the community where he lived and worked.
That ambition would become an important part of his later life, even if the precise nature of his political activities remains difficult to document.
The Flamingo Opens, and Nearly Collapses
The Flamingo opened its casino and entertainment facilities on December 26, 1946. It was a spectacular undertaking by the standards of the day, with an impressive showroom, expensive appointments, and entertainment featuring Jimmy Durante, Xavier Cugat, and Rose Marie. Unfortunately, the hotel rooms were not ready, a serious problem for a resort intended to attract wealthy visitors from Southern California.
Guests could gamble and attend a show, but many had to find accommodations elsewhere. Unfavorable weather also interfered with travel plans, and the opening produced disappointing financial results. According to the figures discussed in Vegas and the Mob, the casino suffered substantial early losses as players enjoyed a run of good luck and management struggled to control operations.
Siegel temporarily closed the property and concentrated on completing the hotel. The Flamingo reopened in March 1947, this time with rooms available and a better opportunity to operate as Wilkerson had originally envisioned.
But Siegel still faced enormous financial obligations. The total investment had grown far beyond initial estimates, and his backers wanted to know where the money had gone and when they could expect a return. One frequently repeated explanation for Siegel's eventual murder is that he had stolen construction money. The surviving record does not establish that allegation as a proven motive. Overspending, questionable bookkeeping, and deliberate theft are not identical.
Nor was the casino necessarily losing money every day during its final months under Siegel. My book describes improving results in the spring of 1947, including profitable periods that suggested the resort might eventually succeed.
Unfortunately for Siegel, his financial problems were only part of the trouble. His control of the race-wire business was weakening, and the Chicago Outfit had plans of its own.
The Race-Wire War Turns Against Siegel
The struggle for control of racing information had been developing for years. Continental Press remained an extremely valuable service, and the Chicago Outfit wanted a larger share of its profits. James Ragen resisted organized crime's attempts to take control, and in 1946 gunmen attacked him in Chicago. He survived the initial shooting but died afterward under circumstances that produced allegations of poisoning.
Siegel's competing Trans-America service faced growing pressure. The overlapping networks were expensive for bookmakers, who sometimes found themselves paying for two information services when they needed only one. By June 1947, Siegel's position in the business had deteriorated.
In Vegas and the Mob, I connect the consolidation of the race-wire interests with the broader disputes surrounding Siegel's finances and authority. The timing is significant. The Flamingo was still struggling to meet its obligations while Siegel was losing influence over another important source of income.
Whether the race-wire conflict directly caused his murder remains a matter of historical interpretation. Siegel had made enemies throughout a violent criminal career, and there were plenty of people with reasons to dislike him. But the organization that financed his Las Vegas ambitions no longer depended on him to operate its gambling interests.
Men like Sedway, Greenbaum, and Berman were already in place. They knew the businesses, understood the investors, and could continue operating without Siegel.
June 20, 1947: Bugsy Siegel Is Murdered
On the evening of June 20, 1947, Benjamin Siegel was sitting in the Beverly Hills home of Virginia Hill when a gunman fired through a window, killing him. His murder remains one of the most famous unsolved gangland killings in American history.
Numerous theories have circulated about who ordered the shooting and who pulled the trigger. Some implicate Luciano and Lansky, while others point toward disputes involving the race-wire business or Siegel's enemies in California. In Vegas and the Mob, I examine accounts involving Frankie Carbo and the movements of suspects after the killing. Those accounts are worth studying, but they should not be mistaken for a judicially established solution. No one was convicted of Siegel's murder.
What happened next in Las Vegas is easier to document. The Flamingo continued operating, and Sedway and Greenbaum emerged as important figures in the property's management and financial reorganization.
The popular version of the story suggests that the two men simply walked into the Flamingo and assumed control immediately after Siegel's death. The reality was more complicated. The ownership structure included corporate interests, investors, financial obligations, and subsequent transactions. Sedway himself would later testify about the purchase of the property.
The distinction matters because the Flamingo did not suddenly become a successful business merely because two gangsters appeared in its offices. It required refinancing, management changes, and an operating strategy that would attract a broader range of customers.
That was precisely the sort of work Sedway understood.
Stabilizing the Flamingo
Sedway and Greenbaum approached the Flamingo differently from Siegel. The glamorous resort remained, but its operators needed customers who would spend money consistently. A casino could not survive solely on occasional wealthy Hollywood visitors. It needed a steady flow of gamblers, reliable service, controlled expenses, and careful management of the casino bankroll.
Greenbaum was an experienced gambling operator, and Sedway understood the relationships among the investors, casino managers, and gambling concessions. Together with other investors and managers, they helped turn the Flamingo into a viable enterprise.
The property's post-Siegel history is sometimes presented as proof that Siegel was incapable of operating a casino. That conclusion is too simple. Siegel had overseen the most difficult and expensive phase of construction, and his successors inherited a functioning resort whose major facilities were substantially completed. Nevertheless, the improvement under the later management group was significant.
They concentrated on operating the business rather than constantly redesigning it.
Sedway was particularly useful because he could work with Greenbaum, communicate with Lansky, and deal with Nevada businessmen. He was not the sole architect of the Flamingo's success, but he was an essential participant.
And unlike Siegel, he survived long enough to enjoy some of the benefits.
Hidden Ownership and the Casino Count Room
The early Las Vegas gambling industry was a peculiar combination of legal business and concealed financial arrangements. The games were legal, the casinos held licenses, and customers could gamble openly. Yet some investors preferred to keep their names away from official ownership documents, while others maintained informal interests through loans, partnerships, or agreements with licensed operators.
That created opportunities for what later became known as skimming. In its familiar casino form, skimming involved removing cash before it was entered into official accounting records. Money taken before recording could be distributed without appearing as ordinary casino revenue.
The distinction between legitimate profit distributions, concealed ownership payments, and unrecorded cash is important. Not every payment to an investor was necessarily skimmed money. But organized crime's interest in casino cash was hardly accidental.
In Vegas and the Mob, I describe the role of the count room and the movement of gambling profits to investors outside Nevada. Lansky was a central figure in the financial network, while men such as Sedway helped oversee local operations. The Las Vegas Club, El Cortez, and Flamingo were part of a business environment in which ownership could be considerably more complicated than the names appearing on the licenses.
The modern Nevada Gaming Control Board did not yet exist. It was established in 1955, after Sedway's death, as Nevada strengthened its gaming oversight. During Sedway's lifetime, regulation was administered principally through the state's tax and licensing system, together with local authorities. That system did not always provide a clear picture of who controlled the money.
Sedway operated effectively within those limitations. His financial relationships made him valuable to the syndicate, while his standing in Las Vegas made him useful to the casinos. His ability to navigate both worlds helped explain his influence.
The Kefauver Committee Comes to Las Vegas
By 1950, federal investigators were taking a much closer look at organized crime's influence over legitimate businesses. The United States Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, examined gambling, racketeering, and the relationships between criminal organizations and public officials.
The hearings were held in the second-floor courtroom of the United States Post Office and Courthouse at 300 Stewart Avenue in downtown Las Vegas. Completed in 1933, the building eventually became the home of the Mob Museum, which opened in 2012. Today, the restored courtroom is one of the museum's principal attractions, preserving the setting where Sedway, Wilbur Clark, and other Nevada gambling figures answered questions about organized crime's influence over the casino industry. It remains one of the most historically significant buildings in Las Vegas, a place where the relationship between legal gambling and organized crime was examined before a United States Senate committee.
The committee's Las Vegas hearing on November 15, 1950, produced revealing testimony about Nevada's casino industry. Sedway appeared before the investigators and identified himself as vice president of the Flamingo Hotel. He was questioned about his relationships with Siegel, Lansky, Greenbaum, and other investors, as well as the race-wire business and the changing ownership of the Flamingo.
Sedway was an experienced operator, but he faced a difficult problem. Investigators wanted precise answers about arrangements that had often depended on informal understandings. They wanted to know who supplied the money, who owned the casinos, who controlled the race wire, and what had happened to Siegel's interests.
His testimony is particularly valuable because it reveals how an insider described the casino business when required to answer questions under oath. It is not necessarily a complete or impartial account, but it is a contemporary record rather than a story reconstructed decades afterward.
Meyer Lansky, Jack Lansky, and the El Cortez
One of the most revealing exchanges concerned the ownership of the El Cortez and the involvement of Meyer Lansky and his brother Jack, commonly called Jake.
Committee counsel Rudolph Halley questioned Sedway directly:
Mr. HALLEY. Does Meyer Lansky still own any interest in the El Cortez?
Mr. SEDWAY. No, I don't think so.
Mr. HALLEY. How about Jack Lansky?
Mr. SEDWAY. No. He also was an associate with us, and then he bought it from us.
Mr. HALLEY. He bought you all out?
Mr. SEDWAY. Yes; with another man.
Mr. HALLEY. What is his name?
Mr. SEDWAY. J. K. Houssels.
The exchange raises important questions about the difference between formal ownership and continuing financial relationships. A person could sell a recorded interest in a casino without necessarily severing every business connection with its operators. Conversely, a continuing friendship or association did not prove that the person still owned part of the property.
The questioning then turned to the Thunderbird, another casino in which investigators suspected connections to the Lansky organization.
Mr. HALLEY. Do the Lansky's have any interest in the Thunderbird?
Mr. SEDWAY. I don't know.
Mr. HALLEY. They stay there a great deal, don't they?
Mr. SEDWAY. Not Meyer; Jake has been there.
Sedway continued by explaining that he had seen Jake Lansky shortly before entering the hospital. The answer was hardly a dramatic confession, but it demonstrated the close relationships among the people associated with several different Las Vegas properties.
The same names appeared repeatedly in discussions of the El Cortez, Las Vegas Club, Flamingo, and other establishments. These were not isolated gambling businesses. They were connected through investors, managers, loans, and personal relationships.
Sedway understood those connections better than most.
The Flamingo's $3.9 Million Purchase
Sedway's testimony also addressed the Flamingo's ownership after Siegel's murder. He described assembling a group that purchased the property for approximately $3.9 million, a figure that helps explain the scale of the financial arrangements involved.
This was not simply a matter of Greenbaum and Sedway walking into the Flamingo and taking possession of a dead man's casino. The resort had substantial assets, debts, investors, and corporate interests that had to be addressed. The purchase and subsequent financial arrangements were part of a complicated reorganization.
In Vegas and the Mob, I describe additional investors and arrangements involving Sanford Adler, Charles Resnick, and James West after Siegel's death. Those details should be considered alongside Sedway's testimony rather than treated as interchangeable descriptions of a single transaction.
The important point is that the Flamingo remained part of a network of investors and operators. Sedway was a central participant in reorganizing that network, and his testimony offers a rare glimpse of the machinery behind the familiar story.
Sedway Explains the Race-Wire Business
The committee was particularly interested in the racing information business, which had generated substantial income for Siegel and his associates. Sedway described paying Siegel $900 per week for the exclusive right to distribute racing information in Las Vegas.
After Siegel's murder, the financial arrangements changed. Sedway described sharply higher costs for obtaining the service, including payments reaching $2,500 per week and demands for still more money.
The figures were substantial for the period, but they explain why the race wire attracted powerful criminal organizations. A service collecting weekly payments from numerous bookmakers could generate enormous income without owning a single casino. Control of the information created influence over the customers who needed it.
Sedway had helped build the Las Vegas distribution network, but he could not prevent the larger struggle for control of the service.
One exchange was particularly revealing:
Mr. SEDWAY. We had no difficulty when he was alive.
Mr. HALLEY. You had no difficulty at all?
Mr. SEDWAY. No, sir.
SENATOR WILEY. Why were they afraid of Siegel?
Mr. SEDWAY. I don't know.
SENATOR WILEY. Who was afraid of Siegel?
Mr. SEDWAY. They wasn't afraid. They just got along. Whenever he made a deal, he kept his word, and they went along with him.
Sedway portrayed Siegel as a businessman who honored his agreements, which was certainly one interpretation. Another was that Siegel's reputation for violence made other operators reluctant to challenge him.
Most everybody went along with Bugsy. When a man has spent twenty years establishing a reputation for violence, it makes sense to avoid unnecessary arguments.
The committee's questioning exposed the uncomfortable relationship between commercial agreements and underworld intimidation. Sedway had worked in both environments, and he knew the difference between a customer agreeing to purchase a service and a customer deciding that refusal was too dangerous.
His testimony also demonstrated how much the business had changed after Siegel's murder. Sedway had once been able to arrange profitable contracts through a powerful associate. By 1950, he was dealing with a different group of men who wanted a larger share of the money.
The race wire remained valuable, but the men controlling it had changed.
The Other Moe Sedway: Family and Community
It would be easy to end Sedway's biography with his gambling interests and Senate testimony, but that would leave out an important part of his life.
Sedway married Beatrice "Bea" Sedway in 1936 and maintained a family life that contrasted with the public behavior of some of his associates. He also developed strong connections within the Las Vegas community, participating in Jewish charitable organizations and serving as head of the local United Jewish Appeal.
UNLV's Southern Nevada Jewish Heritage Project identifies his charitable leadership as an important part of his local history. Accounts of his civic involvement also describe an interest in local politics and community institutions, although the precise titles and dates of any public offices he held remain uncertain.
That complexity is worth remembering. The men who operated early Las Vegas casinos were not all cut from the same cloth. Some were violent criminals who never attempted to establish legitimate community relationships. Others became business leaders, philanthropists, and civic figures while retaining troubling associations with organized crime.
Sedway belonged to the latter group. His charitable work was real, and so were his underworld connections. One does not erase the other.
The same community that benefited from his contributions also depended economically on an industry in which questionable financial arrangements were commonplace. Sedway understood that world better than most. His interest in politics, which reportedly provoked Siegel's fury, was part of his effort to establish a lasting position in Las Vegas.
He wanted to be more than a visitor collecting gambling profits. He wanted to belong.
Sedway's Death and the End of an Era
Moe Sedway died on January 3, 1952, at the age of 57, little more than a year after his appearance before the Kefauver Committee.
He did not live to see the opening of the Sands Hotel in December 1952, the creation of the Nevada Gaming Control Board in 1955, or the subsequent transformation of Las Vegas into a major international resort destination. Those developments belonged to the next generation of casino operators.
But Sedway had helped establish many of the business relationships that made the industry's expansion possible.
His longtime associate Gus Greenbaum continued in the casino business and later became closely associated with the Riviera. Davie Berman survived Sedway by several years, dying in 1957. Meyer Lansky remained influential in gambling and other business interests for decades.
The casino industry continued to attract outside investment, including capital associated with organized crime. Meanwhile, Nevada gradually strengthened its regulatory institutions, and the informal arrangements that had flourished during Sedway's career became increasingly difficult to maintain openly.
Sedway's death marked the passing of a man who had operated during the industry's transition from small downtown gambling clubs to large, capital-intensive resorts. He had been involved in both worlds, helping establish the financial connections that allowed Las Vegas to grow.
Why Moe Sedway Matters to Las Vegas History
Bugsy Siegel became a legend because of his personality, the Flamingo, and his spectacular murder. Meyer Lansky became famous as the supposed financial genius behind organized crime's gambling interests. Moe Sedway never achieved the same notoriety, yet his career offers a more practical explanation of how the Mob established itself in Las Vegas.
He recognized the value of legal casino gambling before the city became a major resort destination. He helped arrange financing and ownership interests in downtown casinos, built a profitable race-wire distribution business, and worked with powerful figures from New York, Minneapolis, Phoenix, and California.
He participated in the Flamingo's development and helped reorganize its operations after Siegel's murder. When federal investigators arrived, he provided testimony that still helps historians understand the complicated ownership arrangements of the period.
Sedway's story also challenges the familiar notion that the Mob simply built Las Vegas through violence and intimidation. Those methods certainly played a role, but the development of the gambling industry also depended on capital, management, reliable information, and relationships with local businesspeople.
Sedway understood all four.
He was not the glamorous public face of the Flamingo, the richest investor, or the most feared gangster. He was the man who could sit down with casino operators, work out an arrangement, and make the business function.
That made him valuable to Meyer Lansky, useful to Bugsy Siegel, and one of the most important figures in the early history of organized crime's involvement in Nevada gambling.
The next time someone asks who helped the Mob establish its Las Vegas casino empire, remember Morris "Moe" Sedway.
The headlines belonged to Bugsy.
Much of the business belonged to men like Moe.
Further Reading: Vegas and the Mob
Moe Sedway's career was only one chapter in the larger story of organized crime's involvement in Nevada gambling.
In Vegas and the Mob: The Real Story of Organized Crime in Las Vegas, I follow the connections among Bugsy Siegel, Meyer Lansky, the Chicago Outfit, the race-wire wars, and the casino operators who helped transform a small desert gambling town into America's most famous gaming destination.
The book explores the hidden investors, financial arrangements, personalities, and conflicts that shaped the industry's formative years, and the decades of Mob influence that followed.
Discover the complete story in Vegas and the Mob, available on Amazon in Kindle and paperback editions.